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1. PREAMBLE: 
The question of appropriate technology for development has been a concern of 
theorists and practitioners for at least three decades.' In recent years the emphasis of the 
analysis has shifted from the issue of creation and diffusion of "hard" technology, to the 
articulation between gadgetry and "soft", social technology.2 For instance, a relatively 
recent study stressed the linkage between biotechnology, venture capital, and 
management as fimdaniental factors in the success —or failure—of a technological 
system.3 The notion of system is an important heuristic device that allows a nuanced 
perspective, relating the context to the culture, structures, processes, and effects of 
technology. Such perpective recognises the complex but intelligible interconnection 
among many factors —physical, cultural, social, political and the like—that configure 
what we call "technology and its circumstances". 
The case of the fog-collection project in the semiarid coastal area of Chungungo 
in Chile's "None Chico" (Little North) seems paradigmatic of the many cases in which a 
weak interconnection between contextual and operational factors apparently can 
transform an early success into a reputed but qualified "failure". A rather recent article in 
the Santiago daily, Las Ultimas Noticias of February 11th 2001 stated: 
The fog-catcher program was at first a daunting success; in five years 
Chungungo doubled its population and solved its water problem, so much 
so that in the outskirts of the village that until then had lived at the edge of 
drought, a relatively prosperous resort villa was installed.. .The media 
.covered exhaustively the goodness of the project, stressing with scarcely 
disguised pride the fact that the artefacts would transform Chile into a 
pioneering country in the developmei,t of alternative water supply. The 
"Chungungo case" was the object of brilliant presentations in international 
seminars; even the UN started an international campaign to alert about 
water scarcity in that out of the way village. 
However, it was reported, "the fog-catchers . . .are living their worst moment... 
Storms have destroyed more than half of these artefacts and now the community urgently 
is seeking a way to have a water system to address the supply problem."6 
II. METHODOLOGY: 
What happened in between the most auspicious inauguration of the project in 
1992 and its virtual demise in 1997? What factors account for its collapse? This 
interpretative survey will attempt to provide some tentative answers to these questions by 
examining and co-relating a number of sources, from scientific and experimental 
materials, to project descriptions and assessments, to financial data, to field report, to a 
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series of in-depth interviews with key informants, and field visits to the sites conducted in 
May-June 2001. 
The terms of reference of this undertaking entailed an "exploratory visit 
to...Chungungo... to assess the situation of the fogcatcher (sic) project" as well as 
interaction with "local authorities, community leaders and other key informants, to 
develop hypotheses about the reasons for the lack of maintenance to the fog-catching 
infrastructure." In particular, this survey was geared to "explore the political context of 
decisions to provide piped water to the village".7 
This report is essentially an initial assessment of the current situation and the 
potential merit of a more detailed study. The fieldwork was budgeted to take seven days, 
with a final draft, originally scheduled for July 31st 2001. During Dr. Carlos Seré's visit 
to Santiago, it was agreed that the final report would be delivered in September 2001. 
However, a preliminary sketch of this report in Spanish, outlining a number of tentative 
hypotheses and findings was sent to the LACRO Office of the IDRC in Montevideo in 
late July. Upon return to Canada an in-depth interview with Dr. Robert Schemenauer, 
formerly of Environment Canada was conducted in Toronto (September 10", 2000). He 
also provided an extensive bibliographical and reference material. Attempts to contact 
Dr. Derek Webb in the UK have been so far unsuccessful. The present document in 
English is a result of the combination of the various sources used so far. 
Although the research was at thorough as possible, within the existing parameters 
and constraints (especially the abovementioned time limitations), there are important 
stakcholders and actors that were not interviewed. One was the Mayor of La Higuera 
(and his designate), who was unavailable during the summer visit. The other set of actors 
is personnel and executives at ESSCO, the regional sanitary services company of 
Coquimbo. The third, most important and numerous, set of interviewees are community 
members, especially the Junta de Vecinos. This particular segment is very important, 
especially since the community has been singled out as one lacking commitment, 
solidarity and receptivity.8 This perception would require a degree of verification as well 
as an effort to see the community's side of the story. 
The IDRC Office in Montevideo (LACRO) provided a fairly complete set of 
background documents and a list of four people who had been key players in the 
development and management of the project. These included two people in Santiago — 
Professors Pilar Cereceda, Geography Department at the Catholic University of Santiago, 
and Oscar Fuentes, of the Universdad Iberoamericana—and two abroad: the above- 
mentioned Dr. Derek Webb, and Dr. Robert Schemenauer. Both Chilean team members 
were contacted and extensive in-depth interviews conducted. These provided crucial 
information, hypotheses and also names and contacts in the field. 
The names of other key prospective interviewees emerged: Mr. Waldo Canto, the 
Regional Director of the National Forestry Corporation (CONAF) in La Serena, Mr. 
Patricio Piñones, the technician in charge of water distribution at Chungungo, and Mr. 
Efrain AlegrIa, the Mayor of La Higuera, the head of the municipality to which the 
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village of Chungungo is ascribed. In fact, virtually everybody pointed to Mr. Canto as the 
most authoritative source for the inquiry. 
Foilowing phone and on site interviews with Professors Cereceda and Fuentes in 
Santiago, the field part of the assessment was conducted in the Coquimbo Region. The 
first day was in the regional capital of La Serena interviewing Mr. Canto at CONAF (the 
National Forestry Corporation's regional) office and establishing the contacts for the 
subsequent visit to La Higuera and Chungungo for additional interviews and field 
observation. The trip by car involved an easy ride to La Higuera and an arduous and slow 
trip through the coastal range in substandard and rather perilous roads, a condition that is 
not irrelevant to some of the fmdings of this report regarding water transportation and 
accessibility.9 
Mr. Canto was a most valuable source of primary data, and his staff was very 
helpful in establishing the interviews with the water technician at Chungungo, Mr. 
Patricio Piñones and Mr. Cornelio Vargas, who was standing in for the Mayor of La 
Higuera, who was on medical leave. Unfortunately, upon arrival at the municipal seat, I 
was informed that Mr. Vargas had broken the appointment and travelled to La Serena and 
that the Mayor would not be able to see me at that time. By sheer chance, a contact with 
Mr. Americo Flores, the Engineer in charge of Planning for the tiny municipal head was 
established. He proved to be perceptible and a knowledgeable about the municipality's 
jurisdiction and water projects in general. 
The extended conversation with Mr. Piñones in Chungungo offered a most 
valuable insight of things in the village —both, technical and micro political. He also 
provided insight into the historical and cultural characteristics of the settlement and the 
effects of the project upon its population, as well as the local circumstances accounting 
for its becoming undone. 
III. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: 
La Higuera is a small inland town of former miners and "pirquineros" (self- 
employed mineral ore scavengers), with reportedly high unemployment, assisted by 
government projects and public works. It is located some 60 kilometres North of La 
Serena, off and East of the Pan-American Highway. It is a municipal seat with a rather 
large territory to cover, mostly scattered and even smaller villages, one of which is the 
costal cove of Chungungo, about 20 kilometres west. 
Since the l940s, communities like La Higuera and Chungungo depended from the 
pole of development and employment provided by the huge El Tofo iron mine, perched 
high in the coastal ranges overlooking the fishing village. The operation, jointly owned 
by Bethlehem Steel and the state-owned Pacific Steel Corporation (CAP) produced iron 
ore for export to the US during WW II and inputs to CAP's steel mills, located at 
Huachipato, some 700 kilometres South of it. The mine's port facility at Cruz Blanca 
(which also housed El Tofo management and employees), is adjacent to Chungungo and 
supplied the town with free access to water and electricity.'° The mine in question met 
the enormous demand for water (for mineral processing in large-scale waterworks) by 
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Though mineral exports sharply declined afler the end of the Second World War, 
under the policies of Import Substitution Industrialisation large amounts of ore were still 
required by the Huachipato steel mills, for the next three decades. In certain way, the 
inhabitants of Chungungo became accustomed to having water and electricity as a free 
good for that prolonged period of The mine was closed as a consequence of the 
neoliberal restructuring of the military regime, its entire infrastructure was dilapidated or 
destroyed: train, waterworks, electricity-generation and machinery. Most the mine's 
infrastructure was scavenged by local inhabitants, and acute unemployment set in. 
Chungungo, despite the loss of water and electrical services, returned to its 
traditional ways of artisan fishing and deep sea diving for abalone (loco) and other 
marine species. In many cases, these activities appear to have entailed significant 
poaching. The social patterns of the village appear to have been peculiar to the nature of 
its inhabitants' occupation. Divers and fishermen (especially poachers) are highly 
individualistic, with a low sense of co-operation and solidarity. On the contrary, they 
seem to compete for very scarce resources, with a frontier-like, zero-sum attitude. 
The (largely underground because of frequent bans to preserve 
the species) brèàtes a boom and bust pattern. In the brief period of bonanza, money may 
appear plentiful, but it is soon evaporated, the remaining months being characterized by 
extreme deprivation. In fact, Chungungo was reported to be amongst the poorest 
localities in Chile in the 1980s and 90s, with income levels calculated at about $36 US 
per month'2 Without water and without a peasant tradition of its own, it was heavily 
dependent on "imports" of any kind of foodstuffs, other than fish and shellfish. Since the 
1970s, the time of the mine closure, the town has sunk into squalor and has become 
severely depopulated. 
IV. THE PROBLEM: 
Water scarcity, especially drinking water, has been a persistent problem in most of 
Chile's largely desert-like North. Though not as thy as the extreme North (Regions I and 
11), the coastal areas of the 3rd1 and 41h regions posses limited water sources. There are 
very few rivers and underwater (fossil) water is insufficient, or very difficult to reach.13 
Since the mid-1970s, Chungungo's water has been supplied by tank-trucks, 
contracted by the Municipality of La Higuera. Every 7 or 10 days, they took the slow, 
perilous and costly 40-kilometre road from the source at the Los Choros River to 
Chungungo. Though government-subsidised at a rate of 50 percent, the cost of water for 
the inhabitants of Chungungo was prohibitive. Water consumption per head in that 
locality has been estimated to be less than 14 litres per person per thy and extremely 
unevenly distributed. It was stored in makeshift barrels in each household, under 
dangerous health conditions and with a deleterious impact upon hygiene.14 
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In the early 1 990s the idea of providing Chungungo with an alternative and non- 
conventional water supply, based upon the abundant coastal fog was first contemplated. 
In fitct, it was reportedly an afterthought of an earlier reforestation and land reclamation 
project initiated in the early 1980s by Chile's National Forestry Corporation (CONAF), 
an autonomous entity depending from the Ministiy of Agriculture. Its stated mission is 
the preservation and replanting of forests (both for reclamation and for commercial use) 
throughout the country. 
Most of Northern Chile's coast experiences throughout the year a persistent sea- 
originating, thick fog, or camanchaca in aboriginal language. Continuous observation by 
CONAF's professionals, meteorologists and the scientific community at large led to the 
conclusion that unless trapped by vegetation, an enormous amount of fog water ascended 
the coastal range and evaporated inland. A national park, Fray Jorge, under CONAF 
jurisdiction provided a living model where shrub vegetation, combined with bushes, 
small trees and large trees to produce abundant precipitation and sufficient humidity to 
generate a self-sustained microclimatic forest in the midst of a largely desert landscape!5 
V. THE ORIGINAL PROJECT: 
For many years and based upon existing comparative scientific data, the idea of 
creating an artificial equivalent to Fray Jorge had been in the minds of engineers and 
scientists. Professor Carlos Espinoza in Cerro Moreno, Antofagasta, had experimented 
with "diamond-shaped" structures to capture coastal fog. But the quantities collected 
were quite small and at the cost very high. Also, for a significant amount of time, 
physical geographers, like Professor Pilar Cereceda from the Catholic University in 
Santiago, had been taking measures of fog concentration and direction in and around the 
El Tofo area. The collected data indicated that the potential amount of water availability 
was enormous and that harnessing it would give a fbndamental tool to re-forest a vast 
section of the Northern coast. The interests of both CONAF and the Catholic University 
converged in the preparation in 1985 of a proposal that was submitted to the IDRC for the 
study and development of a pilot project on fog and fog-collection'6. 
The Centre sought the expertise of Environment Canada (EC) in the field of fog 
and Dr. Robert Schemenauer made a visit to Chile. Meanwhile, Professor Cereceda was 
invited as a visiting resident by EC. Reportedly, during a five-year period the federal 
agency contributed an amount of over $300,000, to defray expenses of personnel, lodging 
and transportation, as well as equipment support. In 1987 IDRC funding began and the 
project took off The early idea of complex diamond-shaped structures was changed to 
the more efficient, simpler and cheaper device of rather common commercial plastic 
meshes; some of the initial designs were modified. The result was a highly efficient 4 by 
12 metres (or 48 m2) double-mesh rectangular structure, supported by a frame and firmly 
planted in the ground with wooden poles and tensor wires. Its construction and 
deployment did not require any costly or complicated equipment and the know-how 
required for construction was minimal and easily understandable. This contraption was 
able to capture in experimental runs at the El Tofo site reportedly 3.2 litres of water per 
square meter per day, far above expectations. It cost was also about $4,000 Canadian in 
1987 values per structure, including the irrigation and storage device.'7 Considering that 
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Chile's northern arid coast is about 1,000 kilometres, the prospects for this appropriate 
technology were indeed promising. 
As said above, the provision of drinking water for Chungungo was not an 
explicitly intended objective of the project design. Nor was within the National Forestry 
Corporation's (CONAF) mandate. In fact, the provision of rural water at the time was a 
responsibility of CORFO —Chile's Development Corporation-- by then in an acute 
process of restructuring along structural adjustment policies (SAP) formulas. The 
realisation that abundant water was obtained at the fog collectors at El Tofo, to be used 
by the reforestation plantation site and CONAF's cabin high in the hill, gave birth to the 
idea of bringing the water down to the extremely poor village below. In this, CONAF, 
the Catholic University and the experts agreed. The purpose changed, from water for 
frees to water for people. The Canadian Embassy in Santiago was also enthusiastic about 
this possibility and it provided the basic fhnding for a water-distribution system. In fact, it 
financed the water pipe bringing the water from the El Tofo ridge to the village.'8 
However, it has been reported that at the time the IDRC was supportive only of the 
design and pilot project of fog-collection, but less than enthusiastic about the distribution 
of drinking water, preferring instead to hand in the implementation of the technological 
package to CONAF. Moreover, it seems that the IDRC ' s position was that the 
implementation side of the project should be as soon as possible run by Chileans -- 
whether through a government agency, or by the community. The other participants, such 
as the Catholic University and the National Forestry Corporation, increasingly shared this 
view. In the latter case, CONAF's Director for the 11/ Region was aware that his agency 
was well above its legal mandate in extending fog-water for tree irrigation to water for 
human consumption. 
YL WATER FOR PEOPLE: 
The development of the water distribution (reservoir, purification and connection) 
component was tendered by CONAF and ESSCO to a public works contractor who, 
despite a few glitches, did a competent job. Yet, the new configuration was not a coherent 
and smooth-running system. The main question remained of how to make compatible an 
unconventional and non-continuous method of water collection (fog) with a distribution 
know-how based upon existing engineering practices in the country. There were, 
however, persistent problems.19 One was the question of purification, both chlorination 
and filtration: the filters tended to clog up with irregular flows and most chlorination 
devices were constructed with a persistent flow in mind. Another problem was related to 
appropriate storage in the piscinas that were constructed. A more serious problem was 
that measurements done by The Sanitary Services Company of Coquimbo (ESSCO) 
persistently gave readings at odds with national water standards. Part of the latter 
problem was related to the methodology and location used to take samples. The fact 
remains that ESSCO laid constant fines to the village's Water Committee for not meeting 
such standards. There were also two less technical administrative problems: the non — 
existence of a permanent decision-making and management structure to handle the 
entirety of the operation and the enormous difficulty the Committee had in collecting 
payments. None of these constituted, on and of itself an insurmountable obstacle; nor 
were they perceived as posing a significant threat to the project. 
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The new water distribution system began its operation in March 1992 and was 
inaugurated with great display of publicity. High-ranking government officials, regional 
and local dignitaries, Canadian representatives and members of the NGO community and 
hundreds of guests were invited. The event also caught national and international media 
attention. Before that, and upon the having made the decision of bringing water to the 
village, those involved in the undertaking sought support from the local inhabitants. A 
social worker was hired to involve the conununity and to be engaged in door-to-door 
surveying and canvassing. Support appeared strong, though not necessarily reflecting 
significant, or for that matter real, community commitment, let alone involvement. There 
was no grass roots articulation of the water problem, or of the meaning of scarcity, or the 
possible venues to its solution for and by the locals. However, the support of the village's 
schoolteacher was elicited and a local Water Committee, with one full-time technician 
was established. It would be charged with the day-to-day operation and maintenance of 
the distribution system and with the servicing and repair of the fog collectors, 6.5 
kilometres away, 750 metres up in the steep hills, at least some 20 minutes by motorized 
vehicle. These activities were to be financed by a portion of the water fee paid by each 
household to the Committee, calculated on the basis of the use registered in residential 
water-metres. 
VII. EARLY SUCCESS: 
Despite some minimal problems and "glitches", between 1992 and 1997 the 
project worked quite effectively. Ninety-two fog-collecting devices were built and this 
provided the village with abundant water. Not only there was water for basic household 
use, but also gardens, vegetables and flowers sprouted in an area that was essentially 
barren and had minimal vegetation.20 With water flowing, regional authorities brought 
electricity and one public telephone to the community. This certainly entailed a quantum 
leap from the squalor in which the time had sunk after the end of the adjacent mine. At 
the level of management, the alliance between CONAF, the Catholic University and the 
IDRC (in conjunction with Environment Canada and with Canadian Embassy support), 
provided some kind of coherence and early impetus to the project. Yet this complex 
leadership and effort could not be sustained. 
On the one hand, there was the issue of coordination between the National 
Forestry Corporation (CONAF), which managed the pipeline from the collectors to the 
reservoirs, and the local ofitferrejnsible mamly for the distribution from 
the reservoir to the village. From the beginning, there was no one single authority looking 
over the entire system, whether top to the bottom, or vice versa. 
On the other hand, there was the enormous difficulty in CONAF's successfully 
transferring the operation to any other authorities, be those the Municipality of La 
Higuera (from which Chungungo depends), or the ministerial and regional bureaucracies. 
When CORFO, which in theory was responsible for rural water, was first approached, it 
took nearly a year for it to report back that the jurisdiction had now been passed on to the 
Water Bureau in the national Ministry of Public Works.2t The latter, in turn, had assigned 
the direct operation of "rural waters" to the regional public Sanitary Service Company of 
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Coquimbo (ESSCO). This agency, in turn, was iii a state of reorganization towards 
privatization and, in the midst of the uncertainty resulting from profound changes an 
imminent privatization. It did not seem to be prone to manage an unconventional 
technology, choosing instead the role of supervising and sanctioning water-quality 
standards. 
As for the Municipality, there was not a sustained interest in the project, which 
was persistently perceived as "odd patchwork", preferring instead a proven formula: 
water pumped about 20 kilometres north, at the Los Choros river,22 as it has been the case 
since the opening of El Tofo mine. Moreover, for the municipal authority, the stakes 
involved in fog collection may have been too small, while procuring "real" water by 
conventional means was both impressive and a source of a political multiplier effect. It 
meant apparently not only the improvement of water supply for La Higuera itself, but 
also a symbol of high-level support for the authorities and, most importantly, a source of 
public-work jobs for its inhabitants. The issue here there seems to have been not so much 
the cost involved in supplying water, but reliability of supply and ability to deliver. The 
cost of trucked water was quite high —enormous in relation to the income of local 
inhabitants: about $2 a day on the average. Meanwhile, fog water —when the system was 
working—run at a fraction of that (about 75 cents a day).23 The problem was that it was 
not always reliable and at times the town had to depend on the trucks. Piped water from 
the Los Choros river, such as that enjoyed by la Higuera, entailed a substantial 
investment in a 20-kilometre pipeline, with pumps and relay stations. Rural water in 
Chile is subsidised to municipalities at 50 percent of the cost, the remaining being paid by 
the consumer 
When CONAF, the Catholic University and the IDRC transferred the project in 
1996-97, there was no one single entity that could provide unified direction. Without 
IDRC support, CONAF was under heavy pressure to give up. There was no follow up in 
planning and, most important, maintenance. Communications between the Water 
Committee in the village and other agencies involved became uncoordinated and finally 
broke down.24 Exemplary of this was the uneasy relation with ESSCO, whose water 
quality control procedures not only were questioned by other stakeholders, but whose 
role —as mentioned-- hatyf slappmg heavy fines to thç Committee fdt water 
stJtçyioiations Thiihappened at the heels of a series of damaging storms, related to 
EFNM6 phenomenon. Lack of maintenance did play a central role in many of the 
collectors coming down. The community was not ready to self-administer and run a 
system that was not theirs and for which they had to pay for and also volunteer. The 
administrative vacuum had a paralysing effect; neglect and disrepair soon set in 
VIII. THE CURRENT PREDICAMENT: 
At the time of the visit to the site in July 2001, there were no gardens, no tree 
plantation, most irrigation work was abandoned and only 15 out of 92 original collectors 
were in any way standing or operational on the mountain top. Trucks, once again are the 
main source of Chungungo's water supply. There was apparently a great deal of 
frustration with the fog-collection project at the Canadian Embassy. This feeling was 
apparently enhanced by the embarrassment created when the Governor General requested 
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to visit the fog project that figured prominently among the "success stories" in the 
internet and the international media, but whose reality was at odds with the images. A 
quick visit by Embassy personnel was able to effect a change of plans and avoided such 
embarrassment. It was under these less than auspicious circumstances that the series of 
critical newspaper reports mentioned at the beginning of this document were published. 
Though on the surface, the water project appeared to be in a terminal stage, the 
interview with the Municipal Engineer and Mr. Piñones, suggested that it is likely that the 
operation would be revamped and continued; at least for some time. For the Municipality, 
the ideal and "permanent" solution to Chungungo's water problem would be an extension 
of the aqueduct that links La Thguera with the traditional source of the Los Choros 
river.25 The cost, of this conventional system is, however, quite high (well over 1 million 
US dollars) for a small municipality, especially if it is geared to address the needs of a 
distant, tiny and not very accessible community. At any rate, according to the Engineer, 
any aqueduct could not be in operation eafs In the meantime, the 
Municipality envisions a mixed system of water-trucks and fog-collectors, the latter used 
to reduce the frequency for transporting tanks to the village. Another alternative ESSCO 
(the Sanitary Services Company), the Municipality and most engineers in the area could 
favour over fog collection is a system of seawater desalinization by means of inverse 
osmosis.26 But this too is not only very expensive but also so far purely experimental. 
Furthermore, it requires bi-phased electrical supply (which the town does not have) and 
its yields are unimpressive: reportedly 50 centimetres of freshwater in 2 by 6 metres 
seawater well in 24 hours. Moreover, the water has to be pumped up from sea level. 
There is a secondary reason to revive the fog-collectors: since theft inception, the 
project has caught the attention of enviromnentalists and "ecological tourists". As 
mentioned, Chungungo has been immortalized in the virtual world of development and 
environmental concerns. In fact, shortly before my visit, a number of grade school 
children from the village were given international recognition by receiving an award on 
their town's water project and had a commendation from Chile's Minister of Education. 
This PR factor provides the Municipality with an added incentive to revitalize the 
atrapanieblas and turn them into a showcase, and a possible source of revenue. 
Therefore, and paradoxically, it seems that for the time being, there is no viable 
alternative to fog water, even as a temporary and complementary solution combined with 
trucking Jflaftact p4qajóiwzllmgness of municipal authorities to take over the 4 ffi — 
bTrs1nflprotiding water to such a small constituency 
IX. FINDINGS, CONJECTURES AND HYPOTHESES: 
On the basis of the documentary sources studied as well as the in-depth interviews 
and field visit a battery of largely tentative hypotheses to explain and understand the 
current predicament of the fog collection project in Chungungo has been constructed. 
These conjectural observations have been presented as a set of interacting factors 
accounting for the paradox that a project with impeccable technical and fmancial 
parameters and with extremely auspicious beginnings ended up, after five years, in a state 
of semi-paralysis and neglect. 
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A basic conceptual and design problem seems to have been that from its 
inception the project was conceived as a sound re-forestation undertaking 
whose parameters were changed to accommodate the objective of providing 
drinking water to a very poor —and poorly studied—community. In this sense, 
while water-collection via fog meshes did not present major difficulties, its 
purification and distribution were always at odds with water collection (or 
essentially were not addressed). From an engineering viewpoint, there was not 
a single, integrated and complementary system. Nor there was an "expert 
culture" among hydrologists conducive to designing and operating a system 
with a discontinuous flow of water, in particular when it came to household 
distribution. In fact, there were acute periods of scarcity in winter, when fog 
condensation occurred below the fog collectors, or when the fog was "drier", 
while during spring and summer water was abundant. This meant that water 
supply via trucks did not completely disappear, even in the "heydays" of 
1992-96, constituting an additional cost to consumers with little capacity to 
pay 
2. A related problem is that, due to the fundamentally "technical" nature of the 
project as first conceived, the community was not involved in any significant 
way in its origins and development. Rather, villagers were brought in only at 
the very late stages of its implementation, after the collectors and the initial 
phases of collection had been completed. This should be seen in the context of 
a community that until the l970s was receiving free water and electricity from 
the El Tofo mine. From the interviews and documentary references it is safe to 
ascertain that the locals perceived water and electricity (even after years of 
paying exorbitant prices for trucked water) were free goods, the same as the 
ocean. Chungungo was not only a poor and problematic community, but one 
which became more de-developed with the closure of the mine. 
3. In conjunction with the above, according to all my sources, there was not a 
previous systematic study —or survey—of the socio-economic and cultural 
circumstances in the village, this despite the fact that the early geographical 
explorations of the site were initiated by an Anthropologist of the Catholic 
University of Santiago, whose assistant then was Professor Cereceda. The 
only attempts in 1992-95 were centred on the hiring of a Social Worker, once 
the project was underway. However, this field work, though of significant 
quality was more professional than analytical and produced few structural 
parameters for subsequent social design, planning and extension. 
4. The weakest point of the project seems to have been the lack of an 
administrative and managerial design to implement the "hard" technology part 
of the undertaking. Administrative weakness, lack of sustained leadership and 
the absence of an integrated operational and managerial structure, 
compounded a persistent "political" problem, related to agency jurisdiction, 
territoriality and vague chain of command (and the lack of coordinating and 
consultative mechanisms). Gravest among these operational flaws was the 
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inability to build and develop administrative capabilities at the grass roots, 
above and beyond the weak Water Committee. There seems that there was a 
lack of solidarity and rational cooperative action in Chungungo, which 
severely crippled the Committee. At one moment, there were some six to eight 
different stakeholders, with vague and competing jurisdictions, all in some 
way above the Water Committee but with little sense of overall direction. 
With the exiting of CONAF and the IDRC and the Catholic University latent 
administrative dysfunctions became manifest. Jurisdictional changes and 
administrative uncertainty (such as with CORFO, the Ministry of Public 
Works, and most importantly with ESSCO) wreaked havoc with planning, 
management, and control. As for the Municipality and the regional authorities, 
the involvement with the project was ambiguous and intermittent at best.27 
5. Climatic problems in 1996-97 damaged the installations, namely the fog- 
collectors, which had been gradually falling in disrepair and poor 
maintenance. More than half of the 92 operating artefacts were left out of 
commission. Inadequate servicing proved to be a deleterious factor, especially 
when lack of cleaning of the meshes and lack of appropriate tension in the 
wires that held the frames and poles on place, facilitated the fall of the 
structures. The availability of labour to do basic maintenance proved to be a 
persistent problem. Most men in the village were not willing to volunteer, or 
to work for the salanes offered However, 1i%Wër&1noi&xnclmed to 
4,Ccept these wagbs Little analysis was done of the differential gender-related 
6ehäiiOüiThe fact that water consumption was metered and charged to its 
users (albeit subsidised at 50% of its cost) was an irritant; alongside the fact 
that supplies were not constant and that water trucks still played a crucial role. 
An ambiance of persistent communal bickering, affecting directly the local 
Water Committee, made difficult the operation of the system. 
6. According to virtually all the interviewees the project was in part a victim of 
its own early success. First, following its highly publicized inauguration and 
the attempts to expand tourism (for instance, Villa Canada), a growing influx 
of population —both local and tourists—. put strenuous demands on the water 
supply, to the point of collapse. The project had been designed assuming a 
population of some 250 to 300 inhabitants, not 1000 to 1200 people as it 
happened in summer and on holidays. Most importantly, there was a 
phenomenal expansion of expectations. Chungungo became a "showcase" of 
successful appropriate technology, widely reported in the Chilean and 
international media, not to mention the internet. From the National 
Geographic to CNN, to the Discovery Channel they all had their eyes and 
cameras trained on the small village. The place acquired an aura of 
international sensationalism which gave the proj a virtual life of its own, far 
beyond its concrete reality 
7. Latent design problems, plus emerging political, administrative and social 
circumstances were compounded and multiplied by adverse climatic 
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conditions at a point in which the major players were transferring the 
management of the Chungungo operation to regional and local authorities. 
The overall effect was systemic breakdown. 
X. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS: 
In sum, two general and highly preliminary conclusions are presented. The first is 
more analytical in nature, though with very practical implications. The experience of 
Chungungo offers an excellent model to understand the complex and inter-related 
problems associated with the creation, development, implementation and sustenance of 
"appropriate" technologies. It also offers a valuable (and heuristic) insight on the 
numerous and at times contradictory interfaces between "hard" and "soft" (or implicit) 
technologies. As a case study, the understanding of Chungungo can be a useful "window" 
for the analysis, evaluation and learning about technology, development and extension in 
a concrete Third World setting. In this sense, it would be quite relevant to carry on a 
more in-depth and systematic study, one with promising implications as teaching and 
training material. 
The second conclusion is more substantive: despite the manifest problems extant 
in the present situation, the fog collection technology appears to be an extremely 
promising and low-cost technology in arid or semi-add coastal areas. This is especially 
the case if this technology is primarily oriented to the development of stable ecosystems. 
Regardless of the numerous problems related to the specific Chungungo experience, fog 
collection technology appears to be a viable and low-cost technology for coastal arid and 
semi arid areas with similar climatic conditions. Scientific data and innumerable 
experimental projects in Peru, Ecuador, Oman, and South Africa, to mention a few, have 
corroborated the Chilean findings. An important network of expertise has been formed in 
a truly global scope; scientific conferences, internet linkages and publications continue 
emerging from this research. 
Even in Chile, there have been two other and apparently very successful, albeit 
less publicized, "private" experiences with fog collection. One is at the Shrine of Padre 
Hurtado, some 100 kilometres south of Ia Serena, by the Pan American Highway. In this 
case, collected water is used as a source of irrigation for vegetable gardens, whose 
produce is the mainstay of a restaurant run by the local priest, Father Luis Brevis28 The 
other example Mr. Canto mentioned was that of a sheep fanner who used fog water from 
collectors to irrigate grazing plots and to provide beverage for the animals. This operation 
was also located south of the regional capital of La Serena and was reportedly terminated 
---• when the farmer sold the land. \j 
All in all, and given the current state of application of the technology, it could be 
that this technological package is better suited to the development of sustainable 
ecosystems, similar to the Fray Jorge ecological reserve, rather than for the provision of a 
direct source of drinking water per se. The field research included a visit to the actually 
operating small fog collection system at the park, where its effectiveness and simplicity 
could be appreciated (there was very little fog at the mountain peak the day of the 
Chungungo visit). But, the lmow-how could also remain useful and highly effective in 
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bringing drinking water to small localities if certain conditions are met. From the Chilean 
experience, two general and broad ranging technological challenges that need to be 
overcome in future projects can be detected in this latter respect. The first is the difficulty 
in developing an integrated collection and distribution system, when its two basic 
processes remain hardly compatible This means 
$ziiBItpeii an pasW)at& %1eohThW6&sg4h6w 
a thett Research and design 
seems fribé fleêSà± iii combining collection with appropriate distribution. The second 
difficulty is the inability of creating and maintaining a management structure (soft 
technology) that would allow the system as a whole to operate and sustain a learning 
feedback ioop, with crucial decisions, assigned responsibilities and follow-ups. This 
means the need to develop an administrative modality that encourages participation and 
support by the users, who can also become self-managers and producers, while making 
services affordable. These two factors point in the direction of the ned of more 
jjtéflèehTch arid: aiieriimentation of uibetW sdft and hal tbg âolleetion 
delivery and purification Here there is an important task for the 
scientific community and for agencies such as the IDRC. 
Looking at the big picture, Chungungo was by no means "a failure". An in-depth 
and nuanced study of the dysfunctional aspects of the project would certainly contribute 
to our understanding of the multiple interactions to consider in analysing technological 
interventions for sustainable development as they unfold in real life situations. One 
aspect that deserves to be highlighted is that all technologies present "life-cycles": they 
emerge, develop, affect changes and eventually fade away, or re-emerge as new 
recombined modalities. Fog collecting in Chungungo represents only a limited phase of 
the fill capabilities of a technology, one needs to be explored hilly. 
The above leads to a number of suggested operational and practical considerations 
in design and implementation to look at "questions" and "problems" before "answers" or 
"solutions" are attempted. (a) The first is the necessity to make a prior socio-economic, 
political and cultural assessment of the "problem" m situ —m this or 
waitE.' msecunty-- ftoih the point ofyiew of those havmg the problent (b) The second 
consideration is the requirement of linking the various elements of hard and soft 
technology in a single matrix of analysis, development and implementation. (c) The third 
is the incorporation of the community in the project well before its onset, empowering its 
members to manage and adapt the new technology to their concrete collective problem, 
requirements and circumstances. A "cargo cult" (or ekeko-like) view of technolog9 on 
the part of a community —in which locals are passive recipients of a gift from "above"-- 
fosters a sense of alienation Particularly important here is to consider the J&ffoiiot 
only of the managers, butI1ts, not only the "elite" of flinctionanes, experts and 
decision makers, but of those••ho experience the problem. Likewise, as the findings 
suggest, a need for 
" the analysis is fundamental Women in the village were 
an important, willing, but hardly tapped resource, one whose support would have been 
crucial to sustained success. (d) Finally, there is the essential need of continuously 
monitoring the social, and politico-administrative forces behind the project, in order to 
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adapt it to changing circumstances, beyond the mere formal transfer of responsibilities to 
national, regional or local authorities. 
b sum, there was no one, single and identifiable "cause" to explain the slow 
abandoning and exhaustion of a most promising, scientifically and financially sound 
project. Rather, it was a myriad of interconnected micro-factors that over time combined 
to bringing it down. The bulk of these factors are managerial, organisational and "micro- 
political". Neither these, nor the small engineerin difficulties that emerged, were beyond 
control, or repair. Of these, 
Ihe lacli of i& oaflSmmLthtetiiid &iiiisiracsI&}vE "to be 
Hopefully this report may have contributed to the understanding of the 
above-mentioned factors and of the possible ways to anticipate and prevent similar 
dysftmnctions in the future. 
References 
'See Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as f People Mattered, 
(London: Blond and Briggs, 1974), passim. 
2 See our "Science, Technology and Underdevclopment: A Conceptual Approach", with O.P. Dwivedi and 
J. Vanderkop, Canadian Journal ofDevelopment Studies, Vol. XI, No. 2, (December 1990), pp. 223-240. 
See our 1998 Report, "The Interlice Between "Hard" and "Soft" Technologies: Biotechnology, Venture 
Capital, and Management in Chile. A Preliminary Report?', internal circulation document prepared for the 
IDRC's Latin American and Caribbean Research Office (LACRO), February 26, 1998, pp. 1-2. 
4Nef, Dwisredi and Vanderkop, bc. cit 
3Las Ultimas Noticias, February 11, 2001, pp. 2-3. 
IDRC, Offer of Consultancy Contract Project No 100910, Contract No. 105786 (July 2001) p.1. 
8Cf. L. Venero, "Informe Social", p. 1-2. This report, apparently by the Social Worker, is appended to the 
Financial and Technical Report presented by Dr. Derek Webb and Mr. Oscar Fuentes , Project No. 93-8751 
(June 1996). 
See, Pilar Cereceda, Robert Schemenauer and Marcela Suit, "An Alternative Water Supply for Chilean 
Coastal Desert Villages", Water Resources Development, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 1992), p.55. 
10 Robert Schemenauer and Pilar Cereceda, "Water from Fog-covered Mountain?', Waterlines, Vol 10, No. 
4 (April 1992), p. 10. 
Cereceda, Shemenauer and Suit, op.cit. p. 56. 
12 Cereceda et al. op. cit p.57. 
13 See Marcela Suit, "Estudio de agua potable rural en las localidades de Chungungo y Caleta Hornos 
RegiOn de Coquimbo — Chile", Thesis, Institute of Geography, Faculty of History, Geography and Political 
Science, Catholic University of Santiago (May 1989), p.2. 
14 
adapt  changing circu stances, beyond l t f r  responsibilities 
ti l, regional  t riti s. 
In ,  one, single i tifiable “ ” explain  
abandoning   pro ising, scientifically  financially  
project. t r, yriad  nected -factors   
 bringing     anagerial, organisational “ i - 
political”.  these,  
ti    possible ays anticipate prevent l r 
dysfunctions  . 
‘ t  Schu acher, ll Beaut@:  Study of i s if People tt r s 
( ondon: Briggs, 1974), passim. 
r “ i , echnology Underdevelopment:  Conceptual Approach”, it  . . i i  
Vanderkop, u l ofDevelopmenf t ies, I, . 2, (Dece ber 1990), pp. . 
w   eport, ‘ rfa  ” r ”  “ lTechnologies: iotechnology, t r  
apital,  anage ent  .  Prelumnary eport”, m l  t prepared   
’s    l  (LACRO), February 26,1998, pp. . 
3 
f, ve i  anderkop, loc f 4 
’ s ticius, February 11, , pp. . 
Ibid 
I , f Consultancy tract Project  100910, t (July 2001) p.1. 1 
 e er , “ r e cial”, p.  report, apparently by orker, is appended t  
i l i l eport presented by r    . r t  , Project . -  
(J e 1996). 
8 
ee, erece a, r l  Suit, “  lter ative ater Supply f r ilea  
l t Villages”, f  s Development, a 8,  ( arch 1992), p.55. 
lo rt enauer r erece a, “ r Fog-covered ountains’’, aterlines,  10, 
( pril 1992), p. . 
ereceda, r  uit, op.cif. p. . I1  
’*   41 op. t. p.57. 
la Suit, ‘%  agna potable r r l  l  l li ades  Chungungo y l t  mos 
egi6n oqui bo - il ”, Thesis,  f eography, Faculty  istory, Geography  liti al 
cience, li  University  Santiago ( ay 1989), p.2. 
14 See Cereceda nd Schemenauer, "La percepción de los consumidores de agua potable de nieblas costeras 
de Chungungo, Chile", Revista Geografica de Chile Terra Australis , No 38 (1993), p. 9. 
'5Corporacion Nacional Forestal, "Coastal Fog Application — Chile" , IJDRC Project No, 90-0202, Final 
Report (1993), p.2. 
16 See S. Fahmy and B.. Schemenauer "Coastal Fog Application — Chile", Project Sumary IDRC 3-P-90- 
0202, (1991). p. 1 
'7CONAF, Informe Final 1993, Annexes No. 1-4. 
IS Schemenauer and Cereceda, 'Water from Fog-Covered Mountains...", p.11. 
19 
CONAF, Informe... 1993, pp. 8-23. 
20 See Marc Margolis, "With Their Heads in the Clouds", Newsweek, October 11, 1993, p.21. 
2tEarlier serious concerns were expressed by Derek Webb. See Webb and Oscar Fuentes, "Infonne técnico 
y financiero" (June 1996), p.3. 
225ee Mr. Ainérico Flores interview with Cristdbal Florenzano of Las Ultimas Noticias, loc.cit. 
23Calculations vary significantly, ranging from almost equal to a favourable and highly optimistic ratio 
when using fog-water. See for Stance Cereceda, Schemenauer and Suit, "An Alternative Water Supply for 
Chilean Coastal Villages", Water Resources Development (1992), pp. 53, 57-58. 
24For a view of the cumbersome bureaucratic arrangement, see Cereceda et al. "La niebla, agua potable 
pare zonas rurales", Revista Geográflca de Chile Terra Australis , No. 45 (2000), pp143-145, also 
Cereceda and Schemenauer, "La percepción de los consumidores...", p. 10. 
Flores cited by Florenzano and interview with Flores (June 2001). 
26Ibid. 
27 Cereceda and Schemenauer, "L apercepción...". p. 10. 
28See Pilar Cereceda, Robert Schemenauer, Pablo Osses, Horacio Larrain y Cristdbal Correa, "Los 
atrapanieblas del Santuario dcl Padre Hurtado y sus proyecciones en el combate a Ia desertificacion" 
FONDECYT project No. 1971248 (circa 2000), p.4. 
29See our "Technology is about People. Basic Concepts and Defmitions", in J. Nef, I. Vanderkop and 
H.Wisenian (eds.) Ethics and Technology (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989), p. 7. 
15 
‘‘   Sche enauer, “  percepcih  10  i res  agua potable  i l s t r  
hungungo, il ”, ista eografca li   lis,  (1993), p.  
‘5Corporacion i al Forestal, “ l Fog pplication - il ” , D  Project . 90-0202,  
Report (1993), p. 2. 
l6  Fah y R. er “ l Fog pplication -Chile”, Project Sumary  - 
(1991), p.  
” , I fo e l 1993, es .
er  ereceda, “  Fog-Covered ountains...”, p.11. 
l9 , I f r e ... , pp, 
2o   argolis, “  t louds”, ewsweek, r 11,1993, p.21 
”Earli  s expressed by  .   r Fnentes, “ rm t
y ” (June 1996), p. 3. 
”Se  mtrico  ith ri tb al zano f  Noticias, . it. 
“Calculations vary significantly, ranging i   equal   le highly opti istic  
 using fog- ater.  instanc ereceda, er uit, “  ti e  Supply 
 l illages” ,  r es evelop ent (1992), pp. 53, 
& r    rso e ti  arrange ent,  r  l l. “ niebla, agua potable 
pare  males”, ta Geogrifca   , (ZOOO), pp143-145,  
eda Sche enauer, “ perception  10 consu idores ...”, p. . 
”Flore  by zano   (June 2001). 
1bid. 
27  c e e auer, “  apercepcion ...”. p. 
erece a, Sche enauer,  sses,  y o l rnea, “ s 
atrapanieblas   e    y  proyecciones t   l  tifi i n” 
 r ject 48 (circa 20001, p.4, 
ee  ‘Technology  People. oncepts ef~tions”,   ef, J  anderkop 
m (eds.)  Technology (Toronto: ll Thompson, 1989), p. 
28 
 
